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BOOK NOTICE
Zen and the Art of Jurisprudence
Matthew K. Roskoski
JURISMANIA. By Paul F. Campos. New York:
Press. 1998 . Pp. x, 198. Cloth, $23 ; paper, $13 .95 .

Oxford University

Lawyer bashing is by no means a remarkable phenomenon. It was
not remarkable when Shakespeare wrote, "[t]he first thing we do, let's
kill all the lawyers, "1 and it's not remarkable today. Paul Campos,2
however, has written a particularly readable example, blending vener
able Western lawyer-bashing and pop psychology with unsystematic
invocations of Eastern religion. Jurismania is named after Campos's
theory that the American legal system has a lot in common with a per
son suffering from an obsessive-compulsive disorder, an addiction to
law that does neither the patient nor those around him much good. In
Jurismania, Campos criticizes our insistence on regulating and legal
izing every aspect of our lives, and our insistence on exclusive ration
ality. Campos argues, with regular Taoist allusions, that rationality is
not and cannot be the exclusive solution to the questions law raises,
and that irrational methods are and should be employed. Campos's
intended audience is "the general reader whose experience of
American law has made him or her wonder if there might not be
something wrong " with it (pp. vii-viii). Should that audience take
Campos's critique seriously, it will strike close to the heart of law and
the legal profession. Thus, although they are not the target audience,
lawyers ought to think about Jurismania because it reflects and ampli
fies a perspective that may be common to many nonlawyers who en
counter the legal system.
Jurismania should be read not as a didactic composition, a treatise
on the flaws of American law and how to fix them, but rather as a lit
erary composition of the type described by J.B. White.3 As a literary
text, Jurismania is not argument-oriented but rather "experiential and

1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, SC. 2,
in THE COMPETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 540, 571 (Updated 4th ed., David Bevington ed.,
Longman 1997).
2. Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
3. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN EsSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM 42 (1990) (discussing legal analysis from a literary perspective).
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performative": it seeks to persuade not by representative data but
rather by sharing narrative experiences with the reader.4 Similarly, as
a literary exercise, Jurismania is "not reducible to other terms - espe
cially not to logical outline or analysis - but express[es its] meaning[]
through [its] form,"5 thus generally avoiding the type of logical proof
Campos seeks to critique. As an invitation to discourse, Jurismania is
well taken. It has a broad, sweeping scope that can provide the start
ing point for a host of valuable inquiries: Are particular laws exces
sive, in that they attempt to regulate a sphere of life best left to private
authority? Do particular cases rationalize excessively, or do they dis
guise leaps of intuition or preference as rational argument? Do par
ticular lawyers, or does the profession in general, undervalue sincerity
and overvalue artifice and feigned emotion?
Even though Jurismania is, fundamentally, a literary text, it still
has substantive and legal aspirations. To be fair, Campos nowhere as
serts that Jurismania is meant to be a self-sufficient critique of
American law. In many places, he expressly disavows any attempt to
suggest remedies for the problems he identifies. But these denials and
disavowals go hand in hand with a treatment that looks and sounds
thorough, such that a reader might be left with a sense that she has
heard all she needs to hear. Further, Jurismania often does shade over
from the narrative to the prescriptive and overtly directs the conclu
sions a reader is meant to draw. This Notice aims to preempt the
sense of completeness one might get by reading Jurismania alone and
to demonstrate that Jurismania is deficient as a free-standing critique
of the American legal system.
Part I reviews the central themes of Jurismania. Part II identifies
some ways in which Jurismania does not tell the complete story.
Campos allows his perspective to color his thinking, distorting his view
of the legal system in at least two ways. First, and perhaps most ironi
cally (given his marked aversion to law-obsessions), since Campos is a
law professor, he tends naturally to see only the ways in which law
pervades any problem, missing nonlegal aspects. Second, as a modern
law professor, Campos misses the extent to which the problems he
isolates have been with us since antiquity. Part III raises a different
kind of question about Jurismania, suggesting that when he complains
about "too much law," Campos condemns legal regimes aimed to
wards the redress of social and economic inequality. Campos's vision
of the law as intruding on a presumptively legitimate private sphere
fails to take into account the ways in which the private sphere upon
which law operates starts off warped by concentrations of wealth and
power.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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I.
If he has done nothing else, Campos has thoroughly escaped from
the normal mode of legal scholarship that White critiques: "voices,
audiences, and languages that seem impossibly sterile or empty."6
Jurismania is an easy and pleasurable read, and it speaks in Campos's
voice, revealing the breadth of his reading and the variety of ways in
which he thinks about the American legal system. Jurismania devel
ops several theses. In fact, the range of Campos's analysis is so broad
that any effort to summarize it in less than book-length form will nec
essarily fail. What follows is an attempt merely to review some high
lights.
Campos's central thesis is "that, in its more extreme manifesta
tions, what Americans call the 'rule of law' can come to resemble a
form of mental illness" (p. ix), specifically addiction. Further, the ill
ness is self-perpetuating and self-destructive: "[I]t is in the nature of
obsessions to cause us to pursue something in such an excessive way
that we not only fail in our quest, but end up pursuing the opposite of
whatever it was we were pursuing in the first place" (p. vii) . In sup
port of this proposition, Campos adduces a broad range of evidence,
drawing from strictly legal sources to nonlegal sources emulating legal
forms. He cites a variety of regulations and codes of conduct, includ
ing those of the NCAA (pp. 6-8) and the Louisville Public Library (pp.
129-30). He points to a battery of cases, some sensationalistic, some
absurd. Included in his collection are the familiar staples: O.J. Simp
son's trial (pp. 17-18) and Jones v. Clinton.1 But his collection also in
cludes some cases that are less well-known to the popular media, in
cluding Sawada v. Endo,8 a Hawaiian marital property case, and Quill
v. Vacco,9 a Second Circuit physician-assisted suicide case.
An additional theme in Jurismania is the inauthenticity of lawyers
and legal thought. As Campos says, "inauthenticity is essential to
authentic legal thought. Practicing lawyers must often maintain a pe
culiar mental state in which they fail - authentically - to recognize
the inauthenticity of their claims" (p. 13). In Campos's vision, lawyers
displace politicians and used-car salesmen as the paradigm case of
false sincerity. One cannot help but wonder how Campos feels about
being a professor at a professional school yet having such utter con6. Id. at 10 ("Those of us engaged in writing of this kind find that the worst and most
painful consequences of the character of our discourse are those we suffer when we our
selves try to write, when we find that we are captured by voices, audiences, and languages
that seem impossibly sterile or empty; diluted; defensive; full of static; in a deep sense un
real.").
7. P. ix; Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690
(8th Cir. 1996), affd 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
8. Pp. 107-113, 117-18; 57 Haw. 608 (1977).
9. Pp. 163-68; 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).

(E.D. Ark. 1994), modified by 72 F.3d 1354
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tempt for the professionals he is creating.10 That qualm aside, how
ever, Campos's criticism certainly resonates with the popular percep
tion of lawyers and legal ethics.
The final core theme running through Campos's work is one he
shares with his colleague Pierre Schlag: a critique of the legal system's
reliance on exclusive rationality.11 To illustrate why this claim to per
fect rationality is mere pretense, Campos develops a three-part "effi
cient process "theory. The three parts of his theory are: "l) In a legal
system, efficiently processed disputes will be settled to the extent that
the available information predicts a likely outcome " (p. 60); "2) The
further an efficiently processed dispute travels through a dispute proc
essing system, the more firmly that dispute is lodged in a legal equilib
rium zone " (p. 61); and, therefore, "3) In an efficient dispute proc
essing system the terminal decision making structures of the system
will resolve disputes arationally " (p. 64). In other words, the really
easy cases settle, the relatively easy cases are decided at trial and not
appealed, and since the Supreme Court only grants certiorari on the
extremely difficult cases, the Supreme Court is almost invariably
making it up as it goes along. Supreme Court cases, according to
Campos, cannot be resolved by mere rationality; if they could, by
definition they would not be Supreme Court cases. At some point, the
Court simply has to make a call.
Apart from the substantive arguments, the rhetoric of Jurismania
deserves mention. Two rhetorical threads that run through Jurismania
are in curious tension. On the one hand, Campos employs a relatively
standard rhetorical move: to belittle law and rationality, he employs
religious metaphors, deliberately analogizing law and rationality to
superstition. For example, he describes lawsuits as "a species of sym
bolic human sacrifice, performed by our relentlessly bureaucratic
priesthood " (p. ix), and describes law school as "a seminary for the
production of a mystifying priestcraft, whose obscurantist incantations
help legitimate the power of the social and cultural elite " (p. 175).
This strategy is certainly not unique to Campos - other authors have
used it to belittle their nemeses of choice.12 Not only is this strategy
offensive - particularly to genuinely religious people - but it is also

10. I owe this observation to Professor Don Herzog of the University of Michigan Law
School.

11. See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) ; Pierre Schlag,
Law as a Continuation ofGod by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427 (1997).
12 See, e.g., A. ERNEST FITZGERALD, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF WASTE (1972) ; RALPH
GLASSER, THE NEW HIGH PRIESTHOOD: THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF A MARKETING-ORIENTED SOCIETY (1967) ; RALPH E. LAPP, THE NEW
PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND THE USES OF POWER (1965) ; MARY MIDGLEY,
SCIENCE AS SALVATION: A MODERN MYTH AND ITS MEANING (1992) ; MARK C. MILLER,
THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLmCS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN
PoLmCAL INSTITUTIONS ( 1995).

May 2000]

1533

Jurismania

in conspicuous tension with the Eastern religious themes Campos
weaves throughout Jurismania.
Campos, in the process of criticizing our society's overemphasis on
rationality and science, employs rhetoric strongly suggestive of some
diluted variety of Taoism. For example, in Chapter 8 he isolates "two
things" that we are all "required" by our rationalist and science
centered culture "to believe" (p. 138). They are:
1. The universe consists entirely of particles in fields of force. There are
no such things as spirit or soul or karma or God, except to the extent
those entities are projections of the human mind. The human mind it
self is either: (a) an independent emergent property of otherwise
mindless biological processes, or (b) can be reduced entirely to a
nonmental account of those same processes.

2. All matter is a produce of mechanistic material processes, and all life
is a product of mindless evolutionary processes. Therefore all teleo
logical (mindful, design-based) accounts concerning the ultimate na
ture of the world are false.13

Campos then proceeds to question these propositions, pointing out
that the decision to accept them instead of a religious explanation is, at
bottom, a leap of faith. If science grounds at some level on a leap of
faith, Campos asks, then what's wrong with the religious leap of faith?
Consistent with this perspective, Campos offers his own "tentative
contribution" towards the goal of slowly eroding America's jurisma
nia:
Law is suffering.
Suffering arises from the desire to get it right.
Rid yourself of that desire and rid yourself of suffering.
To eliminate the desire meditate on these other truths.
We might call this "the way of renunciation."

[p. 192]

13. P. 139. This may be one of Campos's most aggressive overstatements. One wonders
how we can be "required" to believe these things when it seems that every year, more and
more people decline to do so. See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, Morality, Spirituality, and Democ
racy, SOCIETY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 37 ("[T]he very trends that critics attempt to correlate with
diminishing spirituality . . . have occurred despite constant rates of church going, virtually
universal belief in God, and somewhat elevated levels of belief in heaven and hell."). Nor is
it at all clear that modern science and religion are deeply incompatible. See, e.g., D. Boulter,
Public Perception of Science and Associated General Issues for the Scientist, 50
PHYTOCHEMISTRY 1, 6 (1999) (distinguishing the province of science - descriptive report
ing of causal laws and events - from the province of ethics and religion - normative analy
sis of why particular causes exist and whether events are good or bad); Holmes Rolston III,

Science, Religion, and the Future, in RELIGION AND SCIENCE: HISTORY, METHOD,
DIALOGUE 61, 73 (W. Mark Richardson & Wesley J. Wildman eds., 1996) ("Where is God
in the story? God is the historian, the author who informs the action, slipping information
into the world, making the improbable probable, converting contingency into destiny.
Along these lines, the dialogue between biology and theology faces a promising future. . . .
Such an account of God's agency, made for the biological sciences, is readily consistent with
an account made for the human culture.").
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There is manifest tension here. If we have no evidence to conclude
that the antiteleological interpretations of the world are true, and if
the teleological explanations are equally as plausible (p. 143), then
why is religion the paradigm case for foolish and meaningless ritual?
Even granting, arguendo, that a given religion's teleological worldview
is correct (i.e., that the divinity the religion venerates exists and is re
sponsible for the creation), suddenly their rituals no longer seem fool
ish and meaningless. Campos, in other words, switches faces from
time to time - sometimes he is the relentless skeptic, analogizing law
to religion (something we are meant to intuit is absurd), but other
times he is the persecuted believer, decrying the secular dogma that
we are "required to believe."
II.

While Campos clearly succeeds in speaking in his own voice and
avoiding the dry and sterile forms of ordinary academic discourse, he
perhaps goes too far in this endeavor. Robert Pirsig begins Zen and
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance with a small disclaimer - the book
"should in no way be associated with that great body of factual infor
mation relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice. It's not very fac
tual on motorcycles, either."14 In this Part, I critique the proof and
perspective of Jurismania, suggesting that it is not very factual on law
or the contemporary American legal system. Specifically, I suggest
two structural problems with Campos's analysis. First, Campos's pro
fessional perspective - as a lawyer and a law professor 1 5 - biases his
analysis, leading him to see the hand of law at work even when law is
far from the most sensible explanation. Second, Campos's contempo
rary perspective - at times blind to history - also influences his
analysis, such that he sees the world around him as something new, as
a departure from the "old days" even when it is not.

A. The Bias ofProfession
If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem will look like
a nail. Paul Campos is a lawyer and a law professor. One would ex
pect that central fact to have a profound influence on how he sees the
world, and Jurismania bears that expectation out. When Campos de
scribes the extent to which our society is juridically saturated (i.e.,
permeated by law in every direction), it bears asking: How much of
this "juridical saturation" is noticeable only to law professors who al
ways see and hear the legal side of every issue? How much, in other
14.

ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974).

15. Before joining the faculty at the University of Colorado, Campos practiced law with
Latham & Watkins, Chicago.
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words, is merely the ironic symptom of Campos's inability to remove
the law-colored glasses?
Campos opens with the example of Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf, a
guard for the Denver Nuggets. Abdul-Rauf refused to stand during
the national anthem, claiming a religious objection. The New York
Times called to get Campos's opinion on the matter. Campos draws
insight from the subjects the reporter wanted to discuss with him:
I do have some questions I'd like to discuss with the Times reporter,
questions in which he seems to have no interest. For example, what does
it tell us that the NBA actually has a formal rule addressing this particu
lar contingency? How is it that Abdul-Rauf claims to believe his Islamic
faith prohibits him from saluting the flag when no sect of Islam enforces
such a prohibition? And is he ever going to get his game back together?
But the reporter doesn't want to hear about any of that. He wants to
talk about the First Amendment. [p. 4]

One wonders what Campos, who is after all a professor of law, ex
pected. Surely a reporter interested in the religious side of the contro
versy (whether Islam actually prohibits flag salutes) would consult an
expert on religion, not a law professor. Likewise, just as a New York
Times reporter would not consult Billy Packer (a college basketball
broadcaster) about the implications of Roe v. Wade16 (or any other
complex case), he or she wouldn't consult Paul Campos about religion
or sports questions.
Furthermore, Campos's dialogue with the New York Times re
porter could be taken as evidence of a lack of juridical saturation.
One would expect - juridical saturation or not - that the average
citizen would be aware of the major provisions in the Bill of Rights.
That is simply a part of our political culture.17 Thus, the reporter's in
terest in discussing the First Amendment is to be expected. The fact
that the reporter does not want to discuss the details of the NBA
agreement, or "what [it tells] us that the NBA actually has a formal
rule addressing this particular contingency" reveals not the reporter's
fixation on law but rather the reporter's ignorance of and disinterest in
the esoterica of law. Campos's interviewer saw the constitutional law
issues raised by Abdul-Rauf's case, but neither saw nor cared about
the contracts or property issues. Campos's evidence is at least inde
terminate: the jurismaniacal glass can be either half-empty or half
full.
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON, & HERMAN BELZ, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT xxii ("The constitution thus
17. See, e.g., 1 ALFRED

has a configurative effect. This effect is seen further insofar as the Constitution provides the
institutional forms, procedures, rhetoric, and symbols by which politics is carried on in the
United States."). Campos doesn't miss this point. See p. 181 ("As parochial as our own pe
culiar concept of the rule of law may be, we nevertheless know or sense that this concept is
in many ways identical with the constitutive ideology of our public political culture.").
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To skip now to the end, Campos reaches a remarkable conclusion
in Chapter 10. Beginning with the proposition that "[l]awyers are of
ten impelled by their professional obligations to become something
akin to emotional prostitutes; that is, to be persons whose public per
sonae require the simulation of inauthentic affective states" (p. 176) 
most notably, outrage - Campos asserts that "various dramaturgical
requirements of the adversary system are now being assimilated
gradually into all forms of public conversation" (p. 177). The key
problem, per Campos, is that:
[T]hose who mimic the professional personae of lawyers are usually un
aware that lawyers are almost always faking it. So it is that when a
Boulder citizens' group expresses "outrage" over a zoning variance that
will allow a McDonald's to be built, its various members really are out
raged. In this way the gradual juridification of public debate leads to a
general cheapening of political discourse. Such a generalization of court
room language and affect to all matters of public controversy causes
people to use the same terms to condemn a proposed slowing in the rate
of growth of Medicare outlays as they do to lament the practice of geno
cide in Bosnia or Rwanda. [pp. 177-78]

So, as I understand Campos, public rhetoric has escalated lately, and
the law is to blame.
Surely that stretches credibility. If in fact public rhetoric has been
escalating of late, a desire to imitate lawyers is hardly the most likely
culprit. A desire to capture media attention is more likely: the more
extreme the rhetoric, the more likely the protest is to appear on the
nightly news or in the local paper, and to get picked up by the national
media. Lawyers or no lawyers, sensationalism always has and always
will sell papers.18 But Campos is not a journalist, Campos is a lawyer,
so Campos places his emphasis on the role of law.
B.

The Bias of Time

Jurismania describes many of the phenomena it identifies in a
manner that implies that they are somehow new; yet prior generations
suffered through strikingly similar legal excesses. Virtually every
complaint Campos identifies shares a similar historical pedigree, a
pedigree which one might not perceive from the pages of Jurismania.
While Campos concedes that jurismania "is hardly unique to moder
nity" (pp. 4-5), he insists that we are experiencing a uniquely high
dose: "[T]he increasingly bureaucratic structure of modem life has
allowed [the juridical saturation of reality] to accelerate to a truly
18. See SUSAN D. MOELLER, COMPASSION FATIGUE: HOW THE MEDIA SELL DISEASE,
FAMINE, WAR AND DEATH 68-69 (1999) ("Since the news media are part of the entertain
ment media, they are printed to tell the most compelling stories they can. If they don't, they
lose their audience to other, more arresting sources or more simply to apathy and compas
sion fatigue.").
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striking extent" (p. 5). One wonders how true that really is. Perhaps
today's legal excesses strike us as particularly bad because they are the
ones we are suffering through. To take only two examples, Campos
identifies and complains about overly hyped trials and the invasion of
procedurally complex law into formerly private, unregulated spheres
("juridical saturation"). Both have lengthy historical pedigrees.
Overly hyped trials are nothing new, Campos's emphasis on the
O.J. Simpson trial (pp. xi, 17-18, 22, 178, 182) notwithstanding. The
Trial of the Century, Bruno Hauptmann's 1935 trial for kidnapping
the Lindbergh baby,19 which was the first criminal trial to be viewed
nationally on film,20 drew hundreds of reporters to Flemington, New
Jersey21 and sparked a media sensation every bit as extravagant as
Simpson's:22
Every unit of the most complete news distributing setup yet devised
clicked perfectly in Flemington yesterday as the attention of the world
focused on the countyseat of Hunterdon for the opening session of the
trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. Radio, telegraph, teletype, tele
phone and cable facilities were supplimented [sic] by aeroplane and mo
torcycle service to flash second-by-second developments in the court
room where the jury was being selected and the scene in the community
where there was a whirl of activity and excitement but every semblence
of order.23

The media attention was so manic that reporters literally climbed on
counsel tables to get pictures.24 Every detail of the trial was
extensively covered, with headlines like "Wood Expert Ties Ladder
Rail to Attic of Hauptmann's Bronx Home";25 "Bruno Put Thru
Readin', 'Ritin', 'Rithmatic Tests"';26 "Dr. Hudson Infers State Police
Bungled Taking of Fingerprints";27 and "Hauptmann Sentenced to Die
19. The trial itself is unreported. For the (unsuccessful) appeal, see State v.
180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).

Hauptmann,

20. See Jonathan Turley, Transformative Justice and the Ethos of Nuremberg, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 655, 660 n.27 (2000).
21. See Jonathan L. Entin, Using Great Cases to Think About the Criminal Justice Sys
tem, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1141, 1151 (1999) (book review).
22. Note that my argument here is not that the Hauptmann trial tracked every contour
of the Simpson trial. It did not, for example, raise questions of race, or jury nullification. It
did not raise expressly the ability of wealthy defendants to buy superior legal services. My
point here is merely that it did reflect a public obsession with law and lawyering-and that
the phenomenon of media fixation on high-profile trials is nothing new.

23. Alan Painter, Vast News System Clicks Perfectly As Trial Starts, HUNTERDON
COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 3, 1935, at 1; see also Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Rela
tionships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 201 (1999) (describing
the sensationalistic coverage of the Hauptmann trial).
24.

See Laurie L. Levenson, Cases ofthe Century, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 585, 592 (2000).

25. Alan Painter, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 24, 1935, at 1.
26.

D.H. Moreau, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 31, 1935, at 2.

27.

HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 1935, at 1.
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Week of March 18 for Lindbergh Murder."28 Local papers ran weekly
timelines, with day-by-day summaries in case someone (presumably
lost at sea or buried in a mountain cave) had somehow managed to
miss the latest details.29 Hosts of pictures were a daily feature.30 In
fact, the discovery that the proceedings had been secretly videotaped
led to the adoption of ABA Canon 35, prohibiting cameras in court.31
The press covered, as they did to death with O.J., the secondary ef
fects of the trial: "Hotel Owner Fears the Big Trial Will Ruin
Flemington,"32 and "Notables Continue to Flock to Flemington for the
Big Trial."33 The Hauptmann trial even exhibited the same meta-news
effect that the Simpson trial did, as reporters wrote stories about other
reporters.34 And, while modern commentators describe the Simpson
trial as a joke or theatrical, evidently both the Hunterdon Sheriff and
the Hauptmann jury were actually approached by traveling vaudeville
companies and offered contracts.35 As the frenzied atmosphere sur
rounding the Hauptmann trial so aptly demonstrates, it is hard to say
that the current obsession with the law that Campos describes is worse
than that of sixty-five years ago.
Literature also betrays a long history of popular interest in high
profile trials. Harper Lee's To Kill A Mockingbird36 and Arthur
Miller's The Crucible37 are but two examples in American literature.
The obsession is not, however, unique to America. Starting with
28. HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 14, 1935, at 1.
29. See, e.g., The Trial In Brief, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 24, 1935, at 5.
30. See Photographers Have Taken 350 "Shots" in Courtroom, HUNTERDON COUNTY
DEMOCRAT, Jan. 31, 1935, at 2; see also, e.g., Gloomy Trenton Death House Awaits
Hauptmann, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 21, 1935, at 14.
31. See Kelly L. Cripe, Empowering the Audience: Television's Role in the Diminishing
Respect for the American Judicial System, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 260 (1999) ("The cam
era's first, surreptitious appearance in the courtroom resulted in its expulsion for sixteen
years. Following the discovery of a hidden newsreel camera recording the trial of Bruno
Hauptmann, in 1937 the American Bar Association adopted Canon 35, which prohibited all
courtroom photography."); David A. Harris, The Appearance ofJustice: Court TY, Conven
tional Television, and Public Understanding ofthe Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
785, 798 (1993) (linking the Hauptmann trial to the passage of Canon 35).
32. HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 24, 1935, at 1.
33. Constance Allen Ward, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 1935, at 1.
34. See, e.g., Carl W. Ackerman, The Press At The Hauptmann Trial, HUNTERDON
COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 31, 1935, at 1; All Cameras Barred From the Courtroom Until
Trial ls Over, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 1935, at l; D.H. Moreau, Gabriel
Heatter ls One of the Busiest Men Covering Trial, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb.
7, 1935, at 1.
35. See Jury Vaudeville Appearance "Hooey," HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Feb.
21, 1935, at l; SheriffNot Interested in Vaudeville Offer, HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT,
Feb. 21, 1935, at 1; see also Levenson, supra note 24, at 592 (describing the media activity as
having all the trappings of a circus coming to town).
36. HARPER LEE, TO KILLA MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
37. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE (1976).
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Plato's rendition of the trial of Socrates,38 literature is replete with ex
amples of trial narratives - which often parody actual trials.
Shakespeare seems virtually obsessed with trials. For example, con
sider the graveyard scene in Hamlet, in which two clowns debate
Ophelia's suicide.39 The arguments they make track, and were surely
meant to parody, the English case of Hales v. Petit.40 Hales raised the
issue of whether a suicide victim has committed a felony during his
lifetime (to determine whether the suicide's property reverts to the
Crown): can the crime be complete before death occurs? Surely this
is as absurd a legal distinction as is the example on which Campos re
lies - Quill v. Vacco's41 awkward analysis of physician-assisted suicide
(p. 166). As another example, recall the trial in The Merchant of
Venice, in which Shylock proceeds pro se.42 Charles Dickens's Bleak
House43 traces the (fictional) case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, parodying
the way lawsuits sometimes have of taking on a life of their own, well
beyond the issues to which they were originally addressed. Kafka's
The Trial44 and Camus's The Stranger45 both depicted the legal process
as incomprehensible and senseless, in a way that presaged many of
Campos's complaints. Again, Campos's complaints isolate phenom
ena that are hardly new.
Further, the invasion of an all-encompassing and procedurally
complex law is no innovation. Seven centuries before Campos wrote,
Iceland exhibited the same "juridical saturation" that Campos
identifies in America. Law in thirteenth-century Iceland provided
both a solution to problems and a vocabulary for discussing social
arrangements. "Law played a role in more than the definition and
processing of disputes. . . . Norms of good kinship provided the basis
for imposing legal obligation, which in tum buttressed the norms and
so on in continual feedback of mutual influence."46 Law governed
familial and kinship ties, interactions with other kinship groups,
38. See Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates (2d ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1975).
39. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act v, SC. 1.
40. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B. 1562).
41. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
42. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANr OF VENICE, act 4, SC. 1.
43. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford U. Press 1998) (1853). I owe both this
and the Hamlet example to A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. CIN.
L. REV. 819, 823-24 (1990).
44. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Everyman's Library
1992) (1925).
45. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Vintage Books 1989)
(1942).
46. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 221 (1990).
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production of food, etc. And, just as "American legality" incorporates
"an obsessive proceduralism that often seems to amount to a belief in
process for its own sake," (p. 179), so "Icelandic procedure is
remarkable for its extraordinary complexity and its formalism."47
Icelandic lawyers were not above deliberately manipulating the
intricacies of legal procedure.48 Saga lawyers were regularly accused
of "mere lawyers' quibbles and cheating."49 In other words, "obsessive
proceduralism" is hardly unique to modern American law; rather, the
example of Iceland demonstrates that societies were pervaded and
shaped by complex law hundreds of years ago.
The fixation on law predates even thirteenth-century Iceland. The
Roman Empire developed an immense body of judge-made common
law,50 replete with the same sort of inconsistencies that Campos de
cries in American law.51 Law was simultaneously an avenue of privi
lege - "an entry to the governing class . . . [for] many provincials"52 and a scarce resource generally unavailable to the poor or underprivi
leged.53 Further, Roman law exhibited the same form of sophism, and
the same obsession with the argument in and of itself, that Campos
identifies in American law. As Gibbon teaches, the Roman lawyers:
considered reason as the instrument of dispute; they interpreted the laws
according to the dictates of private interest . . . Others, recluse in their
chambers, maintained the gravity of legal professors, by furnishing a rich
client with subtleties to confound the plainest truth, and with arguments
to colour the most unjustifiable pretensions.54

47. Id. at 248.
48. See, e.g., NIAL'S SAGA 300 (Magnus Magnusson & Hermann Palsson trans., Penguin
Books 1960) (describing strategic maneuvers designed to lure a plaintiff into improper selec
tion of venue).
49. Id. at 305-07.
50. See Nicholas Purcell, The Arts of Government, in THE ROMAN WORLD 172 (John
Boardman et al. eds., 1988).
51. To demonstrate law's alleged inconsistencies, Campos offers the hypothetical exam
ple of a school principal confronted with a male student's desire to wear a t-shirt with a sex
ist message. According to Campos, the principal is confronted with inconsistent legal duties:
he must respect the student's First Amendment right to freedom of expression, but he must
also respect the rights of female students not to be sexually harassed. Pp. 35-36.
52. Purcell, supra note 50, at 171.
53. See id. at 172 ("[L]egal measures show the same variety, casualness, and lack of gen
erality which we find in Roman administrative decisions, and indeed it is difficult to separate
the two. . . . The result was that the law was not always sufficiently universal, and the under
privileged might well not reap its benefits.").
54. EDWARD GIBBON, 1 THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 616-17
(David Womersley ed., Penguin Books 1994) (1781); see also Kenneth Pennington, The
Spirit of Legal History, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1997) (book review) ("Just as the
hunters are not concerned with the birds, [the Roman jurists] were not really interested in
law, but only in winning the approbation of their fellows (and others) by proffering an in
genious opinion based on an accepted style of reasoning.") (internal quotations omitted).
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Roman lawyers exhibited every bit as much "jurismania" then as
American lawyers do now. Obsessive proceduralism and sophism are
hardly new or unique to American law.
To the extent that Campos describes a phenomenon that is not
unique to our time, but rather has a lengthy historical pedigree, the
character and contour of the argument changes. Campos should give
more thought to the history of law and legal excess, because it informs
the strategy for change. A problem that is relatively recent may be
easier to uproot. A problem that has been with us since the Roman
Empire may be more difficult to address. Those who disagree with
Campos should care about the history as well. Perhaps, even though
we've successfully weathered at least two millennia- of jurismania, the
time has come to worry seriously about it and seriously attempt a
change. But that case would be much harder to make than the case
against a relatively recent obsession with legalism, and Campos's slim
volume falls substantially short. Yes, Rome fell, but not at the hands
of procedurally fixated lawyers. A historical view simply causes one to
question the significance of the problem Campos identifies.
III.
Jurismania's central thesis - that we have "too much law" raises issues of power and equality that Campos fails to analyze
deeply. This Part begins by noting that generic polemics against "too
much law" are unhelpful. Law is not undifferentiated, nor is it fungi
ble. Moreover, since law is one of the few institutions in our society
expressly dedicated to providing the powerless a voice and a tool with
which to challenge the powerful, analyzing "surplus" law invariably
raises equality questions. This Part next argues that Campos ap
proaches his analysis with a flawed assumption: that the private
sphere without law is entitled to a presumption of neutrality. Often,
however, the private sphere starts out skewed - heavily biased in fa
vor of wealth, power, and privilege - such that the incursion of law
has a leveling influence. Finally, this Part concludes that, beginning
from his flawed assumptions about the pre-law baseline, Campos often
selects for derision precisely those elements of the law that are directly
concerned with remedying inequality.
A. "Too Much Law" is Meaningless

Campos analogizes law to water: some is "without doubt a good
thing," but too much "and we drown" (p. 178). This analogy fails,
however, because water, unlike law, is fungible such that one need
only measure quantity to ascertain excess. Law consists not of an un
differentiated mass but rather of a multiplicity of discrete items: stat-
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utes, regulations, and cases. Judicial decisionmaking is decentralized
and incremental; it proceeds case-by-case.55
Further, if one is to do anything other than merely bewail the
complexity of law, one must select from among the various bits and
pieces of law. A person troubled by too much water can remove it in
discriminately - sandbagging or bailing. A community troubled by
too much law cannot remove it indiscriminately. Starting a law
reduction campaign by abolishing the homicide law, for example,
would be absurd. Note that one need not understand Jurismania as a
polemic against all law to accept this critique. Indeed, Campos is clear
that he does not intend to advocate anarchy: "[T]he real argument
isn't about whether law is a good or a bad thing," but rather about
whether or not we have too much law (p. 178). That question - too
much law? - is empty, however, without specifics, and Campos has
no vision of how to separate the wheat from the chaff.
B. Jurismania's Flawed Assumption
Jurismania not only fails to identify which laws are surplusage, but
it also fails to appreciate that any attempt to do so necessarily raises
fundamental equality issues. Equality is certainly a major concern
(though, admittedly, not the only coµcern) of the law. While our legal
system is not immune to capture by wealth and power,56 it is no coinci
dence that the Constitution chooses the phrase "equal protection of
the laws."57 The courtroom as a level playing field is deeply embedded
in our cultural mythology.58 Therefore, before condemning law's ex
cesses, one should examine the questions of inequality to which law is
addressed; and before valorizing a regime of informal social sanctions,
one should ask whether the emphasis on law increases or decreases
inequalities of power and voice.

55. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). Hadfield makes this point in the
context of an economic analysis of the excessive complexity of law, which she argues raises
the cost of law beyond the means of individuals. The point is equally applicable to Campos's
thesis, that the esoteric complexity of law makes it both absurd and economically inaccessi
ble.
56. For thoughtful and well-documented exposition of this point, see generally id.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
58. Cf Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users
39 (Oct. 11, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("We like to think of the
legal system as a site of remedies and protections for the injured and disadvantaged . . . . We
cherish court as institutions immune to capture. . . . ). Whether law can ever achieve this
goal is largely immaterial, as long as the effort is worthwhile. As Dr. King said, "The law
may not be able to make a man love me, but it can keep him from lynching me." Martin
Luther King, Jr., quoted in ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING 41 (1974).
"
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Jurismania does not do that. A fundamental problem with
Jurismania is its assumptions about the baseline - the regime into
which law intrudes. Campos conceives of law as an undesirable incur
sion into a presumptively superior private sphere, as his analogies re
veal: "[I]magine a culture in which doctors thought chemotherapy was
so wonderful they encouraged people to undergo treatment whether
they were sick or not, or in which generals routinely sang paeans to
trench warfare and saturation bombing" (p. 184). Both examples de
pict law as fundamentally destructive - an evil we sometimes have to
tolerate to secure its benefits - and both examples treat the status
quo, before law's incursion, as fundamentally desirable.
Campos's baseline assumption is clearly visible in his explanation
of the goals of law.' Campos sees the aim of "final elimination of risk
itself'' as driving "total juridical saturation" {p. 29). He analogizes this
objective to living in Boulder, and more particularly to shopping at
Alfalfa's, an expensive Boulder grocery store where the shopping
experience is "risk free and 100 percent guaranteed" (p. 29). This
section of the book is quite revealing - it speaks from privilege, to
privilege, while mocking privilege; but its vision of law's aim is
extremely limited. A text by a law professor begins from a point of
privilege and leaves little room for alternative views. Maybe people
"buying the $30 per pound smoked salmon they will carry back to the
communal condominium in new Range Rovers and Saabs" {p. 28) see
law as a vehicle for the elimination of risk, but others less privileged
may see law as a vehicle for the redress of inequality. Indeed, this
view sees inequality as "[t]he Theme that dominates all others" in the
sphere of law,59 because "equality in our system is inherently and
necessarily unstable. Without strenuous efforts, it fades over time."60
Perhaps then the question is not whether we have too much law, but
rather, "Can legal strategies and techniques be improved and, if so,
would this make any real difference to the position of those who are
disadvantaged?"61
The section "Welcome to the Working Week" is even more
illuminating, and the disjunction be�een the experiel,lce Campos
narrates and the experience of an average blue-collar worker sharply
exposes the extent to which private power tilts the pre-law playing
field. Campos finds a "modern panopticon" in the daily routine of an
office worker: getting up at precisely 6:17, getting dressed, driving to
work, performing meaningless office tasks, and "emerging from
59. HAROLD W. HOROWITZ & KENNETH L. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 1 (1969).
60. RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS:
REsISTANCE 6 (1999).

STORIES ABOUT RACE AND

61. Bob Hepple & Erica Szyszczak, Preface, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW
ix (Bob Hepple & Erica Szyszczak, eds. 1992).
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towers of glass that, at precisely 5:07 every afternoon, disgorge rivers
of their exquisitely regulated occupants" (pp. 31-34). This narrative is
meant to illustrate the all-pervasive (and impliedly negative) nature of
law.
It's hard to imagine, however, a description that could more thor
oughly ignore the experience of people not fortunate enough to have a
white-collar job. For example, while Campos's clothes may be a "deli
cately calibrated semiotic system" (p. 32), the blue-collar worker's are
often a uniform demanded by her employer - one that costs her an
average of $95 per month.62 Occasionally, such uniforms are supple
mented by "pads worn inside her uniform (which, incidentally, cost
her almost one-tenth of her weekly wages)" because employers do not
allow workers "a [bathroom] break for six-hour stretches."63 In the
absence of government intrusion Guridical saturation), private regula
tion dominates even the most intimate and embarrassing minutiae of
people's lives. Campos's hypothetical worker bums his time away de
veloping the paper trail necessary to fire a useless employee who
"clings to his sinecure with all the tenacity of a python," relying on
various elements of the labor law to protect him from dismissal (p. 32).
His portrait of the entrenched, untouchable employee bears no re
semblance to the reality of the worker who begins her day with verbal
sexual harassment, and complains to her personnel manager, who
"grab[s her] breast and sa[ys], 'Be nice to me and I'll take care of
you.' "64 While law may be pervasive and obstructive, private power
(which reigns supreme in the absence of law) is equally, if not more,
injurious.
Campos's assumption - that the status quo, without law's inter
vention, is inherently worthwhile and deserves preservation - thus
neglects the effects of privilege and the importance of law as a leveling
force. Privilege, wealth, and power pervade the background against
which law is superimposed, such that removing law (entirely or in
part) leaves not a neutral, objectively fair and right condition, but
rather a tilted condition, biased by wealth and power even more than
the legal system is. The core objection to Campos's account is that
Campos sees law's intervention as presumptively unjust, imposing un
necessary regulation and supervision. That analysis presumes - im62. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 97 (1997) (reporting results of a
survey of over 400 welfare and low-income single mothers from cities in four states over a
six-year period).
63. MARC LINDER & INGRID NYGAARD, VOID WHERE PROHIBITED: REST BREAKS
AND THE RIGHT TO URINATE ON COMPANY TIME 2 {1998) (detailing the extent to which
blue-collar workers are routinely required to work for long durations without access to
restroom facilities).
64. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 49
(1979).
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plicitly or explicitly - that the background against which law regu
lates is presumptively just. Such a presumption cannot be supported.
Wealth and power inequalities tilt the pre-law playing field such that
legal intervention and regulation can no longer be presumed objec
tionable.
C.

Campos's Neglect of Equality Law

Just as Campos misses the inequality of the status quo, so too he
misses the equalizing effects of the laws and legal processes he derides.
If Campos's examples are to be taken seriously, he seems to have se
lected as surplus those laws that directly relate to redressing power
imbalances. Campos criticizes the laws requiring handicapped parking
spaces (p. 32) ; laws regulating the firing of employees (p. 32) ; and the
hostile work environment sexual harassment doctrine (pp. 35-36).
Take, for example, Campos's analysis of what he calls "the sordid
national spectacle which is the Paula Jones-Bill Clinton litigation."65
That is, to be fair to Campos, all he says about it in Jurismania. In
other settings, however, he has described Jones v. Clinton66 as exempli
fying the problem of jurismania.6 7 The fact that Campos selects a
sexual harassment case as an example of Jurismania is itself telling,6 8
but more telling is the absence of an alternative. If the law (or at least
the legal theory) upon which Jones v. Clinton was based is an example
of legal excess, then what nonlegal solution does Campos propose?
Speaking of Abdul-Rauf, he says: "Not so long ago informal social
pressures would have been exerted on a basketball player to stand for
the national anthem" (p. 5). If this analysis is meant to be of general
applicability, it is deficient because it fails to recognize inequality of
65. P. ix. Perhaps Paula Jones is a poor example, since she received substantial support
from President Clinton's political enemies. Absent a legal remedy, however, would Ms.
Jones have received such support? Absent the lawsuit, supporting Paula Jones would have
been a poor investment for anti-Clintonites.

66. 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1 994), modified by 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), affd
520 U.S 681 (1997).
.

67. See, e.g., Paul F. Campos, Clinton in Crisis, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan.
30, 1998, at B7 ("Only in America do we have a legal system that is so thoroughly out of con
trol and so certain of its own rectitude that incidents such as the surreal proceedings sur
rounding the Paula Jones affair are not only tolerated, but actually held up as exemplars for
other cultures. 'Learn from us,' we say to other countries. 'You, too, can enjoy the benefits
of a dispute processing system that allows platoons of hostile lawyers to harass your nation's
chief executive with six straight hours of questions regarding the most intimate details of his
sex life and the precise appearance of his genitals. We call ours "the rule of law." ' ).
"

68. This assumes, of course, that Ms. Jones' allegations were true. The author recog
nizes that this proposition is certainly open to controversy. If they were false, then Jones v.
Clinton might be an example of legal excess. Notably, Campos seems willing to entertain the
assumption that the allegations were true. See Campos, supra note 67 ("I am not minimizing
the significance of either the Jones or Lewinsky affairs. If substantially true, these various
allegations of sexual impropriety would form an excellent basis for refusing to vote for
Clinton.").
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power. One wonders, exactly what "informal social pressures" a 24year-old government clerk can bring to bear on the Governor of her
state.69 Presumably ostracization is not an option given the relative
power disparity. Shaming, an option Campos has advocated,70 would
be rather tricky for Ms. Jones to arrange, especially once her target
was elected President. Law, for all its flaws, at least provides the pow
erless with a vehicle to challenge the powerful. Mere derision for the
"sordid spectacle" of Jones v. Clinton is insufficient unless one is ei
ther willing to leave Jones with no remedy at all, or able to suggest a
viable alternative.
Note that, just as I do not impute to Campos the extreme position
- no law, just social sanctions - so I do not advocate the opposite ex
treme - no social sanctions, just law. As to any of the phenomena I
identify as symptoms of a tilted playing field, informal social mecha
nisms can sometimes play a vital role. In the case of sexual harass
ment, for example, women can often achieve impressive results by
confronting their harassers.71 The example of sexual harassment is il
luminating, because it highlights the relationship between law and so
cial sanctions. Law can lead as well as follow,72 and one important way
in which law can lead is through its symbolic or expressive force.73 Be
fore law recognized sexual harassment as a violation of women's civil
rights, I suspect it was more difficult to bring social pressures to bear
against a harasser. The harassee may have felt isolated, may have
wondered if she was overreacting, and may have had no reason to be
lieve that anyone else would support her in her objection to the har
assment. She may not even have known to call it harassment. Once
the law lends its legitimizing force, however, it establishes the validity
of the harassee's complaint. Now she has words for what is happening
to her, and she knows that she is neither alone nor overreacting, be
cause her society has placed its imprimatur on her complaint. That, in
69. See Richard Lacayo, Jones v. The President, TIME, May 16, 1994, at 45.
70. See Paul F. Campos, A Way Out: Hold Public Shaming, LOS ANGELES TlMES, Sept.
22, 1998, at B7. In his article, Campos seems to envision Congress engaging in the act of
shaming. That solution does not resolve the power problem, it merely displaces it: How is
Paula Jones to secure the attention of Congress? She must first capture the attention of the
public, and doing that is infinitely more possible with a legal claim.
71. See MARTHA J. LANGELAN, BACK OFF! How TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND HARASSERS 153-200 (1993).
72 See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Law and the Questfor Equality, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
7 ("[L]aw cannot only respond to social change but can initiate it, and . . . lawyers, through
their everyday work in the courts, may become social reformers."); Kathryn E. Suarez,
Comment, Teenage Dating Violence: The Need for Expanded Awareness and Legislation, 82
CAL. L. REV. 423, 470-71 (1994).
73. For discussion of law as a symbolic and expressive device, see Sherman Clark, The
Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381 (1999); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).

May 2000]

Jurismania

1547

tum, makes it easier to invoke informal social sanctions - to confront
the harasser personally, to elicit the support of other women in the
workplace, etc.
I do not mean to suggest here that Campos is entirely insensitive to
questions of privilege and power. Far from it - one central theme of
Campos's critique is that the hypertrophy of American law tilts the le
gal playing field in favor of the rich. He uses the Simpson trial to show
that very point (pp. 22-23):
The grand irony of the American legal system is to be found in precisely
this: that it is by their very efforts to make law 'fair' - efforts that per
versely make the benefits of law ever more dependent on the expertise of
a specialized sector of the upper class - that lawyers in this same sector
of the upper class have made many of the benefits of law unavailable to
anyone other than members of the class to which those lawyers belong.
[p. 25]

He also recognizes the irony associated with lawyers' purporting con
cern for the poor :
This is generally followed by utopian statements to the effect that the
government 'should' make 'high quality' (a.k.a. expensive) legal services
available to everyone: statements that to be actualized would necessitate
the sort of wealth redistribution that would in turn require the elite legal
establishment to surrender some of its economic and social privilege,
which of course it isn't going to do. [pp. 18-19]

Thus, I mean not to suggest that Campos is blind or insensitive to
questions of privilege, but rather to suggest that before Campos can
condemn the American legal system as excessive and overly devel
oped, he must necessarily grapple with the equality questions raised by
the obvious implication of his critique.
* * *

One element of Campos's complaint is surely well-taken
exclu
as his colleague Pierre Schlag has pointed out, is diffi
cult if not impossible to sustain. Yet, rationality necessarily pervades
the law - if Campos urges us to emote our way to legal solutions, he
owes us an explanation of how we can make such a regime function.
Campos says that "apologists for American law always claim in its de
fense that 'the system works' without ever bothering to explain what
they mean by this" (p.viii) . What I, at least, mean, is that the system's
emphasis on rationality provides a framework for consensus - a basis
upon which people bitterly opposed can agree to accept a decision.
Per Brandeis, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,"7 4 yet issues of con-

sive rationality,

74. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent
ing).
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troversy cannot be settled on emotive grounds. An opinion that reads,
"we've thought long and hard about this; we gazed into the sea; we
communed with forests of Yosemite; and we consulted - at length our consciences" is unlikely to persuade. Perhaps Campos is right that
"we cannot decide efficiently processed legal disputes on the basis of
'reason.' We merely decide" (p. 185). Judges, however, must per
suade - they speak with authority, but at bottom that authority rests
on persuasion, on the willingness of the populace and the coordinale
branches of government to accept judicial decisions. Rationality is the
judiciary's tool to effectuate that persuasion and achieve that support.
Campos's point cannot stand in its strongest form. Although some
legal disputes cannot be resolved by resort to reason, reason is
necessary to reach the point where we know which disputes are
efficiently processed. Further, reasoning can certainly eliminate some
options, suggest others, and narrow the range of choices from which
we must select. Elements beyond formal logic surely enter into the
calculus, but to mock reasoning in toto is to stretch a point too far.
Solzhenitsyn struck much closer to the truth: "I have spent all my life
under a communist regime and I will tell you that a society without
any objective legal scale is a terrible one indeed. But a society with no
other scale but the legal one is also less than worthy of man."75
Solzhenitsyn emphasizes the centrality of balance. Perhaps Campos
concurs, but if so it would be easy to leave Jurismania under a
misapprehension.
The problems with Jurismania that this Notice identifies can easily
be taken to reflect the enormity of the task Campos set himself.
Jurismania is a small book, under 200 pages. Jurismania is also a fun
read, full of lively examples and clear, engaging prose. If Campos at
tempted to include the perspective of nonlawyers, discuss the degree
to which the phenomena he identifies are new and the degree to which
they are old, and identify the specific laws he thinks are and are not
surplusage, Jurismania would become a massive book and profoundly
tedious to read. Campos is certainly entitled to choose readability.
Take Jurismania as an open question, an invitation to consider the
breadth and territory of American law, an inquiry into the merit and
necessity of aspects of our legal regime. Do not take Jurismania as an
answer - its foundations are not firm enough to support a prescrip
tion, but they certainly suffice to suggest an inquiry.

75. Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart, Commencement Address at Harvard
University, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, June 8, 1978, at 680.

